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THE SINGLE PUBLIC SERVICE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TURNAROUND STRATEGY:
INCOMPATIBLE OR COMPLIMENTARY FOR IMPROVED
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY?
H KROUKAMP
ABSTRACT
The SouthAfrican public service has unfortunately rapidly gained a reputation
for inefficiency, corruption and incompetence. Government has therefore
introduced a variety of legislative measures to ensure that the public service
would play a meaningful role in a well-functioning country, one that maximises
its development potential and the welfare of its citizens. Examples of these
measures are the Single Public Service (SPS) and the Local Government
Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS), two seemingly contradictory measures to
accomplish the above-mentioned objectives. Concerns that a SPS was a
move towards recentralisation by central government were countered by the
LGTAS to strengthen local government per se. It was found that both projects
endeavour facilitative measures for improved coordination and integration of
services in local government to provide efficient and effective services.
Keywords: Local government, single public service, local government
turnaround strategy, countermeasures for inefficiency
1. INTRODUCTION
The onset of democratic transformation in SouthAfrica in 1994 had a profound
influence on local government, which progressed from being a third tier of
government to an equal, autonomous sphere, with implications for greater
delivery of services. The unrealistic expectations by the public generated
through this process led inter alia to public disillusionment due to a failure of
government to deliver basic services and create conditions conducive to local
economic development. This failure to deliver may ultimately lead to reversals
in efforts to deepen the democratic process in SouthAfrica.
The introduction of the Single Public Service Bill in 2008 in South Africa
brought new speculations that government was moving towards
recentralisation after a period of 14 years of democracy. Assumptions were
that the decentralisation policies adapted after the 1994 elections to enhance
the quality and the effectiveness of public administration, had failed. Although
developed and developing countries have shown a tendency towards
decentralisation during recent decades, the present indications are that some
governments are retracting these efforts and prudent steps are being taken
towards recentralisation.
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What were regarded as major advantages of decentralisation, are nowadays
disputed issues. However, in December 2009 the South African Cabinet
approved a comprehensive local government turnaround strategy (LGTAS)
based on five strategic objectives to ensure that local governments will play
their meaningful role as envisaged in the 1996 Constitution. This, in effect,
raised the question whether the SPS idea had been shelved by the
government and/or whether a differentiated approach was to be followed to
accommodate both local government and a single public service. In this
article attention will be focused on an analysis and critique of the SouthAfrican
local government, measures to counter inefficiency in local government and
the Local Government Turnaround Strategy in order to determine the value of
the various aspects of both the Single Public Service and the Turnaround
Strategy in the current SouthAfrican context to improve service delivery.
2. SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PERSPECTIVE
One of the most important developments in terms of governance has been the
movement towards the building and strengthening of local government
throughout the world. There is a growing recognition that fundamentally
different kinds of governance for public management and the delivery of local
public services are required. Governance is described as the exercise of
control over society and the management of its resources for social and
economic development. Demands for increased governmental
responsiveness and accountability have played a significant role in this
development. According to Devenish, Govender and Hulme (2001:4), two
factors contributed to the making of a modern democratic government. These
factors include ensuring accountability through inter alia the existence of an
open and unbiased judicial system that values general respect for the rule of
law and human rights within a country. Such system should also build and
sustain a vigorous civil society and ensure that governmental and political
power is dispersed to prevent government from becoming too powerful. This
situation is complicated when taking into consideration the new challenges of
governing. These challenges include:
· fast-paced economic and social changes;
· a growing complexity of policy issues;
· problematic political/administrative interface;
· a need for a simpler and more transparent political process;
· multiplication of controls and too many procedures hindering change;
· low morale among public servants;
· low public administration productivity;
· growing financial constraints;
· weak financial management, fraud and corruption;
· weak public participation structures; and
· citizens' lack of confidence in the public service (Shiceka 2009a:16).
34Journal for New Generation Sciences: Volume 9 Number 2
The constitutional change that paved the way for a democratic dispensation in
South Africa directly impacted on the public sector. Prior to the national
elections in 1994, the governing authorities were structured in terms of three
tiers or levels (central, provincial and local). SouthAfrica was a unitary state in
the sense that the central legislature was supreme and all power was vested in
it. Consequently, only those powers that had to perform specific functions
were delegated to provincial authorities who, in turn, delegated where
necessary to local authorities. However, the 1996 Constitution provided for an
innovative approach to governance by introducing concepts such as
cooperative governance, and by making provision for autonomous spheres as
opposed to levels/tiers of government. These spheres of government, inter
alia, had to:
· provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent
government for the Republic as a whole;
· respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of
governments in the other spheres;
· refrain from assuming any power or function except those conferred
on them in terms of the Constitution; and
· exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that did
not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity
of government in another sphere (Section 41 (1), Constitution 1996).
The introduction of the concept of cooperative governance explicitly indicated
that the 'old' form of governance, where everything was centralised, had to be
decentralised. However, it was not specifically stipulated in legislation how
cooperative governance should take place in reality. Subsequently, the fact
that the respective roles and responsibilities of each sphere of government
were not always clear, gave rise to a situation whereby fragmentation,
confusion and duplication occurred as various and different interpretations
prevailed. This was evident from the report of the Presidential Review
Commission (PRC) presented to President Mandela in February 1998. The
report stated that:
“Since little progress had been made in remedying the
inequalities and inefficiencies of the past and that the costs
and quality of the rendering of public services left much to be
desired, the role and functions of the public services had to
be reviewed and should the National Government not
hesitate, in certain extreme circumstances, to resume
functions delegated to certain provinces or their
departments, where those provinces provide irrefutable
evidence of inability to execute those functions” (PRC
1998:6).
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It can therefore be deduced that if the initial drive of decentralising functions
did not produce satisfactory delivery of services, such services would be
centralised. Up to that point, no such actions were taken by the government,
although dissatisfaction with the quality of services was rife.
Fraser-Moleketi (2007:4) furthermore asserted that insufficient attention was
given to the capacity of the provinces to assume their devolved powers,
especially given the poor financial control culture due to the lack of an effective
system of monitoring and evaluation, and a continued 'silorised' approach in
the delivery of services, resulting in poor integration of delivery efforts across
government. Apart from the integration of services, the implementation of
policies was, and still is, problematic (Republic of South Africa 2009b:9). On
the one hand, policies are sometimes, due to a lack of time, interest,
information or expertise, framed in general terms and the implementation is
left to implementation agencies that might thwart the original intention of the
policy (Republic of South Africa 2009b:12). On the other hand, the policies
might embrace so much detail that the actual meaning becomes vague.
Particular measures therefore had to be taken to address this situation as it
was clear that national departments and provincial administrations did not
have the capability or authority to improve the functioning of government.
3. MEASURES TO COUNTER INEFFICIENCY IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
Various pieces of legislation were introduced to address the abovementioned
situation, such as:
• the Local Government Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act 117 of
1998);
• the Local Government: Municipal SystemsAct, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000);
• the Public Finance ManagementAct, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999);
• the Municipal Finance ManagementAct, 2003 (Act 56 of 2003);
• the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 (Act 13 of
2005);
• the Municipality Property Rates Amendment Act, 2009 (Act 19 of
2009); and
• the Local Government: Municipal SystemsAmendment Bill (2011).
These legislation established forums to promote and facilitate
intergovernmental relations between the president and premiers and mayors,
and ministers and provincial members of executive councils responsible for
concurrent portfolios (Republic of SouthAfrica 2008:1). Apart from the above-
mentioned legislation, the Public Administration and Management Bill was
tabled in 2007, also known as the Single Public Service (SPS) Bill. The
objectives of the Bill are as follows:
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• to deepen integrated service delivery by creating service delivery
points from which the citizen could access public services. Multiple
institutions were to collaborate on creating a 'single window' of
access;
• to align the institutions that comprise the machinery of the
developmental state strategically in order to complement one another
so as to operate effectively and fulfil the needs of SouthAfricans; and
• to create common norms and standards for human resource
management and development and conditions of service across the
three spheres (Visser 2007:1).
Focus areas covered by the SPS Bill are:
• the facilitation and transformation of systems and mechanisms for
service delivery to ensure smooth and seamless service delivery at
and between all institutions of government;
• integrated service delivery platforms and front offices;
• integrated planning, budgeting and reporting measures across all
spheres of government;
• ease of mobility of senior managers and staff between and within the
spheres of government and other institutions;
• clearly defined roles, responsibilities, accountability and funding
arrangements;
• aligned training and capacity building to ensure the transfer of
knowledge and skills across all spheres;
• maximisation of economies of scale in Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT) goods and services; and
• elimination of duplication of costly ICT applications whilst replicating
best lessons and practice (Conradie 2008:80).
The single public service is seen as a critical and strategic intervention of
government to further enhance and strengthen the capacity of the system of
government to be able to successfully deliver on the state's developmental
agenda. According to Tshandu (2007:62), this decision was taken due to the
belief that developing countries need strong governments, which lead
administrative systems that bolster government efforts, and which implement
their policies with expertise, compassion, efficiency and effectiveness.
The announcement of the SPS Bill was received with scepticism, and various
concerns were noted (Conradie 2008:81). The SPS can be seen as an explicit
drive towards recentralisation as the Bill repeals and amends various acts.
The Bill bestows widespread regulation-making functions to the Minister of
Public Service and Administration at all levels of government that would
threaten the ability of municipal councils to determine and implement their
own policies and practices when it comes to their employees, thus allowing
government to enforce its own policies at provincial and local levels.
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The SPS Bill encroaches on the constitutional integrity of local government to
govern its own affairs. Furthermore it is silent on the question of who decides
on the remuneration of municipal senior management and the fact that the
appointment procedure and conditions of appointment will be determined by
national law, not by the municipality (De Visser 2008:5). According to De
Visser (2008:6) there is concern that performance management in local
government will also be done according to the procedures and norms and
standards prescribed by the Minister of Public Service andAdministration with
the risk that the synergy linking the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and
budgeting framework with the performance management, will be lost. The
SPS Bill therefore removes performance management from the budgeting
framework and the instruction to municipalities to facilitate community
involvement in performance management (Moloi 2007:32). It is furthermore
argued by Conradie (2008:82) that the single public service will not be
appropriate to solve problems in service delivery because progress in service
delivery lies in the hands of public servants regardless of the system in place.
If public servants are not dedicated, committed and supportive to government,
there is no way service delivery will be improved. It is thus better to address the
causes of poor service delivery, which include lack of resources, rather than
resorting to a new system (Dentlinger 2008:3; Sexwale 2009:4).
Although the Minister of Public Service and Administration indicated in
October 2009 that the SPS Bill will be enacted (Baloyi 2009:2), no such actions
are forthcoming. However, in December 2009 the Cabinet approved a
comprehensive Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS) inter alia to
strengthen local government's role in service delivery, raising the question
whether the SPS idea has been shelved.
4. LOCAL GOVERNMENT TURNAROUND STRATEGY IN
PERSPECTIVE
The launch of the LGTAS resulted from two seemingly separate, yet
interrelated concerns. The first concern is the increasing community
dissatisfaction about poor municipal service delivery, resulting in protests and
civil disobedience causing millions of damages to state and private property
(Republic of South Africa 2009a:2). The second concern is the overwhelming
number of municipalities (279 out of 283) receiving poor audit opinions, either
disclaimers or qualified opinions, from the Auditor General during the
2007/2008 audit cycle due to a lack of controls, mismanagement and lack of
governance principles (Republic of SouthAfrica 2009b:4).
The LGTAS is a comprehensive strategy, which proposes a differentiated
approach that recognises the different economic conditions, capacity and
support needs of individual municipalities and focuses on five strategic
objectives and six key interventions (Shiceka 2010b:2; Shiceka 2009b:2). The
strategies for before and after the 2011 elections are also displayed in Figure 1
(Vika 2010).
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A ministerial advisory and monitoring structure was established to ensure that
all role-players effectively contributed to the LGTAS. The National
Coordinating Unit (NCU) was set up in the Department of Cooperative
Governance and TraditionalAffairs (CoGTA) to oversee, monitor and report on
the progress of the LGTAS across government and society. An
intergovernmental working group has also been established to support the
implementation of the LGTAS. This group consists of officials from national
sector departments, the offices of provincial premiers, provincial local
government departments and the South African Local Government
Association (SALGA). Its purpose is to provide intergovernmental
perspectives to the development and implementation of the LGTAS. Other
functions include the provision of resources and advice. Technical Services
Units (TSUs) were furthermore established provincially. These units are also
coordinated by the NCU, as well as Rapid Response Teams within the NCU to
attend to critical interventions in municipalities across the country to achieve a
two-day turnaround response mechanism to community grievances (Shiceka
2010b:20).
A monitoring, evaluation and reporting framework with a set of indicators has
been developed to allow for systematic gathering of credible data that will
support implementation. The framework includes the Citizen's Report Card,
which will ensure community involvement and oversight of the effectiveness of
the strategy.
The question can be posed why the LGTAS will be different from previous
efforts to improve local government per se. According to Vika (2010:21),
previous interventions such as Project Consolidate and the five-year Strategic
Local Government Agenda lacked political championing and failed to focus on
the root causes of local government distress. In addition, they had no
command system, and neither did they enforce a single window of
coordination approach. Both Project Consolidate and the five-year Local
Government Strategic Agenda applied a 'one-size-fits-all' approach, whereas
the LGTAS caters for individual municipalities' specific challenges.
The introduction of the LGTAS and the functioning thereof raise the same
concerns as was the case with the introduction of the SPS (see subheading 3).
According to Shiceka (2010b:21), new provisions will empower the minister to
prescribe the qualifications and experience of people appointed to
management positions and to regulate their salaries and benefits to ensure
stability in the leadership of municipalities. The amendments also prohibit:
• party political office-bearers from becoming councillors or municipal
officials;
• the suspension without salary of managers charged with serious
offences, including corruption and fraud, or
• inciting residents to protest against the municipality.
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Managers facing disciplinary action will not be permitted to resign or seek
employment in another municipality. Although the proposed amendments are
laudable, it might mean that, if power is concentrated at the national level of
government, too many minor decisions have to be referred up the hierarchy
for approval. This does not necessarily improve the quality of decisions, but it
almost certainly leads to bureaucratic delays that are costly and frustrating.
Individuals and organisations at lower levels have too little discretion to do
their jobs efficiently and are discouraged from taking initiative. Centralising
tendencies are often reinforced by organisational structures and
accountability systems that are geared more to allocating blame and
punishing failure than to rewarding success or establishing incentives to
accept responsibility. Hierarchical accountability adds layers of bureaucracy
without necessarily securing more effective control. For these familiar
reasons, over-centralisation leads to slowness and inefficiency in operational
management and difficulties in adapting to change (Magnussen, Hagen &
Kaarboe 2007:2131).
Taking cognisance of the above-mentioned, one should decide whether the
introduction of the LGTAS will lead to shelving the idea of a SPS. When taking
the objectives of both the SPS and the LGTAS into consideration, it seems as
if these objectives can form part of a concerted effort to improve coordination
and integration in government in order to facilitate efficient and effective
delivery of services. Both projects envisage a single election for national,
provincial and local governments with the benefit of a single manifesto, one
financial year, common five-year medium-term planning, aligned human
resource and budget frameworks and a single public service. Autonomous
local government can thus be achieved with the introduction of the SPS,
assisted by the LGTAS that will strengthen local government.
5. CONCLUSION
Speculation that the implementation of the SPS was shelved due to the
introduction of the LGTAS was rife after the approval of the latter strategy by
Cabinet in December 2009. The same speculations have been voiced
regarding inter alia the amendments to legislation to ensure more national and
provincial involvement in local government affairs in respect of appointments
and accountability. The impression that recentralisation was on the cards was
created, contrary to the stipulations in the Constitution. However, instead of
proposing and speculating whether this is true or not, it should be
acknowledged that all access of citizens to services should be promoted
through improved integrated public services by national, provincial and local
government to give effect to the basic values and principles contained in the
Constitution. Whether these two ideas, the SPS and LGTAS, are therefore
mutually exclusive or complementary is debatable, but possible as the LGTAS
supports the SPS idea of strengthening local government within a single
public service.
41
However, service delivery cannot be solved through any model or system if
public servants are not dedicated, committed and supportive to government.
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